1997
Not understanding at that time that op-ed page editors needed contributions limited to 750 words or so, I failed to find a publisher for this one. But as the wreckage in Iraq unfolds, I still believe this was good advice.
Copyright Larry Seaquist, 1997
It looks like we are turning the corner on the latest contretemps in Iraq. Unless those with sabers drawn will not be satisfied until they have stabbed something, we are moving into the end game where each side will get just enough and give just enough to stand down.
Doubtless this soft landing will disappoint those who have been urging much more fierce strategies. Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz urge the President to stop the mollycoddling and get rid of Saddam [“We Must Lead the Way in Deposing Saddam,” Washington Post op-ed, Nov. 9]. Robert Zoellick advises Mr. Clinton to start getting tough [“Strike Hard,” Washington Post op-ed, Nov. 18]. All three were senior officials in the Bush administration with significant roles in the Gulf War.
Surely, their basic advice is sound: we should be trying to get rid of Saddam and we are going to have to show fierce resolve if we hope to keep a coalition together until he does fall. Just lurching from crisis to crisis in the hope that the UN weapons inspectors will eventually pull his biological, chemical, and nuclear fangs is a policy likely to leave ex-President Clinton explaining after some future disaster why he allowed this situation to drift on unresolved.
Here we go again. Just when we were getting used to idea of two or three days together without an Iraq crisis, along comes the incomparable, the bizarre Saddam with another weird challenge. No Americans, says he, shall rummage around inside his country looking for forbidden stuff—the bugs and gas, nukes, and assorted missiles he was forced to forswear in defeat after the Gulf War.
Is he nuts? After seven years of trying to curb Saddam by strangling the Iraqi people, some on the Security Council were beginning to talk of dropping the sanctions. Now he forces solidarity among his tormentors. Disagreement among the Security Council could have translated into a much-reduced threat of military action from the U.S. Now with our favorite enemy tweaking our nose and the world’s leaders all backed into our corner, the American president gets to take a free shot. Unless Saddam starts groveling soon, it seems just a matter of time before a high technology military strike attempts to knock some sense into Baghdad.
What a puzzle. After all these years, we still know very little about what is going on inside Iraq and nothing about what is going on in Saddam’s mind. If he is not off his rocker, what sort of twisted logic is he following? Is he trying to disrupt the inspection teams on the brink of discovering forbidden weapons programs? Maybe he is trying for a diplomatic bank shot which cleverly leads the coalition to break apart after a deceptive burst of solidarity? Perhaps he tired of being dissed and likes the spotlight? Whatever, he surely understands power. Our course seems pretty clear: keep squeezing and standby to hit him at the slightest provocation. Maybe someday he’ll learn; eventually he’ll die—one hopes not of old age. And anyway, we don’t really have an alternative. There are worse things than Saddam—like an Iraq which shattered into pieces and left us a real mess.
I wonder. Suppose he is not crazy. Is there a different way to think about this?
We do know that Saddam understands power. We also know that he will act viciously if it is slipping away from him or someone doesn’t support him.
For a couple of years reports have been persistent that he and his security services only really control Baghdad and the main cities. The army is obedient but not loyal. After all these years in defeat, privation, and the execution of dissidents, a tight clamp by the security services is necessary to prevent the collusion among officers which could lead to a coup. And the security services: to Saddam, they must seem pretty iffy themselves. They are hated. Every individual enforcer and informer must know that if Saddam goes, they go. The only alternative to being killed immediately is to flee. We know that he has to keep paying these people to assure their support.
If this is the picture Saddam sees when he looks at his power base then his actions become quite reasonable. He needs an outside enemy. The best enemy of all is the United States backed up by the other great powers. With the sole superpower and the entire international community against them the Iraqi people, the army, and the security services have no option but to stay in line a little while longer. With his grip strengthened, who knows? Maybe he will evade the sanctions. Maybe he will achieve the biological or nuclear capability necessary to hold the whole region hostage—captive become captor. The most important thing—Saddam’s true vital interest—is staying in power. Now that is a motivation we can recognize. Even in a democracy the first job of an elected official is to get reelected.
So what is the best thing we can do for Saddam? We could concert a unanimous international policy to launch a punitive military strike and extend the sanctions. That will suit the man just fine. The more ferocious the better.
Okay, you say, I see where this is going. If we really want to hurt him we loosen the sanctions and avoid military action. That will leave him vulnerable, power base eroding. But here comes the Catch 22. If he does fall, probably from a bullet, are we not left with a mess even worse than Saddam? Is it possible our interest is the same as his: that he stays in control?
Here is the real core of the Iraq problem. Ever since calling a sudden halt to combat operations in the Gulf War, we have been guided by fear of losing him. The demise of Saddam was too awful to contemplate. Better the devil we know.
Well, we have known this devil for a long time now and he’s not improving. It is time to rethink. Policy makers and pundits need to sort through two questions: What would speed this man on his way? And if he disappeared, what policies would help the Iraqi people start on a track toward the prosperous democracy that would give themselves, their neighbors, and us real security?
To pull the rug from under him, the last thing we want to do is brandish military force. Everyone knows we can shoot up the Iraqi army, cut their bridges, and destroy a few power plants. We’ve got it on tape.
The worst thing we can do to Saddam is side with the Iraqi people. Every time he starts trouble we should retaliate brutally—by loosening the sanctions and sending trade missions, by snickering to ourselves and chatting with his neighbors about how he’s loosing his grip and pulling the stunts of a weakling. The better off the Iraqi people, the less they have to fear, the less they hate us, the weaker Saddam.
What about the other problem—avoiding the atomization of Iraq? East Germany collapsed in the same way, but there was a strong West Germany there to catch it. Rather than a friendly Germany we have a rather hostile Iran and a less than trusted Syria. Could we shape events so that a transitional Iraqi government might take hold?
At least two steps would be required: Lifting the sanctions and helping the economy restart gives us a twofer: it undercuts Saddam and it boosts the likelihood that the different stripes of Iraqi citizens will prefer a prosperous future together over separatist violence or the tyrannies of a hundred warlords.
The other step is the more important for the short term. Most likely, the immediate successor to Saddam will be a military man. Seemingly, the army is the only source of a leader with enough reach to impose an interim government. We should make it clear right now that we are ready to help such a man on horseback if he is indeed headed toward a democratic government with responsible policies. We can emphasize that “responsible” means no more threatening the neighbors and opening the weapons sites to UN inspection. Now is not the time, satisfying as it may be, to swat the Iraqis again. We have been there, done that. If we are truly interested in bringing the Iraqi biological and nuclear weapons programs out in the open, and if we are truly interested in bringing the Saddam era to a close, now is the time to kill ’em with kindness.
Larry Seaquist is the founding Chairman of The Strategy Group. He was a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War.